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Abstract This article looks at the causes and impact of a range of current events 
related to migration, examining them from the perspective of present-day demographic 
trends in africa and the Middle East. The quest for decent prospects in life acts as the 
incitement and rationale behind the push–pull factors which underlie the movements of 
people from these parts of the world. The article sheds light on the extraordinary nature 
of modern migration, which is creating pressure on policymakers to ensure appropri-
ate policy and economic resolutions are formulated, as well as providing answers to 
how the formation of trenches between nations and nationalities occurs, which stems 
from collective identity discourses. By applying a structural and socio-economic feature-
focused approach to explaining the migration process, the article highlights the impact 
of socio-psychological mechanisms on shared decision-making processes, and aims to 
build an improved and broader conceptual understanding of the ongoing demographic 
shifts.
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Introduction
Demographic shifts have existed since ancient times as an integral and collective com-
ponent of civilisation on the african continent. The leading causes of these shifts were 
environmental and meteorological conditions, which matched the human and animal 
requirements of the former tribal and nomadic societies. These shifts were also guided 
by subjective views that interpreted the underlying ‘realities’ and were inspired to a cer-
tain degree by communal group interests in the respective geographic locations, that 
is, tribal claims over water resources, territory or agricultural areas. in modern history, 
large movements in populaces continue to occur, transferring a complex combination of 
economic and political issues from the countries of origin into the countries of destina-
tion. The unprecedented developments in terms of recent migration movements have 
provoked a multitude of challenges. The lack of conceptual clarity among European pol-
icymakers to find sustainable solutions, and the lack of political will and cooperation to 
achieve suitable ‘crisis management’ at hot spots and in countries of entry into Europe, 
are contributing to the proliferation of unexpected economic and social collisions in 
modern societies and are hampering the creation of meaningful tailored solutions.
General observations on demographic 
developments in Africa
Demographic shifts in africa in the recent past can be linked to fast-paced globalisation, 
violence, armed conflict and crises. in recent years these factors have had an increased 
impact on changes in population density and can also be linked to changes in birth and 
death rates, economic decline and migration. in order to produce reliable demographic 
projections in africa, national census figures and health and demographic surveys—
which provide fertility, mortality and migration data—are taken into account, along with 
historical data on births, deaths and migration. using this data, population estimates 
are calculated for every country in africa and the estimates are then aggregated for 
the continent. it is important to note that census figures for many african countries are 
not accurate. in some instances, current population estimates are based on old census 
data and are little more than projections themselves. Migration is the single most dif-
ficult component of population change to measure reliably, according to the un (2013).
The primary reasons for demographic change in africa are substantive disruptions of 
the peace and a lack of adaptable economic measures and provisions, both of which 
create a perpetual inability to cover essential needs and support livelihoods. Conse-
quently people are forced to leave their home countries for both safety reasons and to 
achieve their aspirations for a decent life. people who are forced out of their original 
countries create pressure on the social and economic systems in the receiving coun-
tries, not only at the time of their arrival through initial high numbers in a certain area, 
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but also in the generations to come, as ultimately their children and grandchildren swell 
the base population to several times its original size.
Finally clichés, information received through communication and media channels, and 
unrealistic promises of a better life at the other end of the journey in countries such 
as Germany, Sweden, austria and the uK, become ‘pull’ factors for people who have 
been pushed out of their countries of origin by terror, war and human rights abuses. 
The worldwide almost instant and unlimited access to the communication technology 
network and a steady development of cheaper and faster transport facilities, allow for 
better mobility in remote areas and less developed countries on the globe. particularly 
in africa, the resulting developments were seen in an increasing use of mobile devices 
during the past decade. The global media dissemination of high-standard life perspec-
tives in countries where peace, social stability and security seem to be a granted crite-
rion in everyday life, provide people with a ray of hope for a better life and an incentive 
for people to migrate to Europe.
The confusion regarding how to face the additional problems in Europe connected 
with the influx of migrants is highlighted by the way in which European leaders are 
grasping for uncoordinated solutions, as well as the lack of consensus about how to 
share the burdens amongst all Eu member states.
according to Eurostat, the highest number of first-time asylum applicants in the sec-
ond quarter of 2016 was registered in Germany (with more than 186,700 first-time appli-
cants, or 61% of total applicants in the Eu member states), followed by italy (27,000, 
or 9%), France (17,800, or 6%), Hungary (14,900, or 5%) and Greece (12,000, or 4%). 
These five member states together account for 85% of all first-time applicants in the 
Eu28 (Eurostat 2016a, b).
Impact and consequences of migration flows 
on Europe
The armed conflicts in the Gulf and the Middle East have added considerably to the 
migrant flows coming from the african continent as the result of pre-existing conflicts, 
and hardship (i.e. in nigeria, Somalia and Sudan) has exacerbated the situation. Thus 
both these factors have contributed to the demographic changes in Europe. Europe is 
confronted with a mixed-migration flow, comprising economic migrants as well as asy-
lum seekers (park 2015). in 2014, Eu member states received about 650,000 asylum 
applications, followed by over 1,015,078 migrant arrivals in 2015 (park 2015). in 2015 
the highest number of first-time asylum applications was in Germany (497,110), Hun-
gary (202,330) and Sweden (175,490) (Eurostat 2016a). in 2016, Europe received over 
262,935 arrivals by sea, mainly from nigeria (5%), Eritrea (4%), Gambia (3%), Côte 
d’ivoire (3%) and Guinea (2%) (un High Commissioner for refugees 2016, for main 
migratory routes into the Eu, see Figure 1). During the first few months of 2016, the 
highest number of first-time applicants was registered in Germany, with almost 175,000 
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first-time applicants, followed by italy (22,300, or 8%), France (18,000, or 6%), austria 
(13,900, or 5%) and the uK (10,100, or 4%) (Eurostat 2016b).
Migrants from Africa as a possible solution for the ageing 
labour force in Europe
Demographic pressures, such as those caused by the ageing labour force in Europe, 
increasing critical labour shortages and deficits of skilled workers in developed coun-
tries, have resulted in the growth of mixed migration, both regular and irregular. The 
migration crisis presents a big challenge for Europe and is steering discussions among 
the member states on the issue of demographic pressure as the result of the ageing 
European society, concerns over national identity and migrant integration, and ques-
tions regarding the economic impact of migration on the member states, as well as the 
importance of finding a common asylum policy and sufficiently managing the external 
borders of the Eu. Europe is facing the worrying demographic trend of an ageing and 
shrinking population. The Eu’s total fertility rate is not much more than 1.5 children per 
woman. according to The 2015 Ageing Report of the European Commission, the popu-
lation of the Eu member states will reach 523 million in 2060, with the working-age 
Figure 1  The main migration routes into Europe.
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population (15–64 years old) falling to just 202 million (European Commission 2015c). 
as the Eu’s working-age population will decrease by 17.5 million (European Commis-
sion 2015a) in the next decade, there will be a high dependency ratio, most probably 
resulting in reduced pension and welfare systems and a scarcity of labour by 2035 
(international Migration institute and university of oxford 2011). Germany, for exam-
ple, having the oldest population of all countries in Europe, is facing increased labour 
demands, as jobs in the country are being created so fast that the native society is una-
ble to fill them. in the long term, migration could significantly contribute to maintaining 
the sustainability of the welfare system and ensuring the sustainable growth of the Eu 
economy by filling niches in both the fast-growing and the declining sectors of the econ-
omy. Thus incoming educated migrants are assets with regard to the future European 
labour market (European parliament 2015). To a large extent the future of economic 
growth in the Eu will depend on whether young migrants arriving in Europe possess 
the skills needed to contribute to the efficiency of European labour markets compared 
to the native population. More highly educated migrants could affect the labour mar-
ket outcomes for native workers as they could have an adverse effect on the wage 
and employment levels of existing workers and affect the labour supply. an increase in 
the population could also increase the demand for goods and services and thus affect 
aggregate demand (aiyar et al. 2016a). The level of education and the labour status 
of the migrants in their countries of origin is often a decisive factor when seeking fur-
ther employment in the European labour market. However, even highly skilled migrants 
often face discrimination, as a large number of migrants with higher education qualifica-
tions experience professional downgrading after entering the European labour market; 
this is the result of a lack of recognition of qualifications from third countries and the 
poor transferability of professional experience (European research area 2013).
Less-educated low-skilled migrant workers may increase pressure on public services 
such as health care, housing and education systems, and this poses a risk of depres-
sion in public wages and increased unemployment (Ellyatt 2015). Low-skilled migrants 
are willing to work for lower wages than native workers and thus this puts downward 
pressure on wages, temporarily lowering the wages of incumbents and reducing the 
capital–labour ratio. Such migrants also create a less favourable net fiscal position 
because as households they contribute less in taxes and social security (Dadush 2014).
Migration steers political divisions across Europe
Europe is currently experiencing political divisions on the issue of migration, with the 
conflicting views of member states, driven by economic, social and cultural divergences, 
creating a highly fragmented environment, endangering future European integration. 
The inflow of refugees is likely to continue for years, if not decades, and therefore 
Europe has to find a common solution and take coordinated policy action. The Schengen 
system of open borders lacks the ability to cope with a crisis situation of this scale (aiyar 
et al. 2016b). The uneven exposure to the migration crisis has caused diversity in soci-
etal attitudes towards migration, with the largely globalised societies of western and 
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northern Europe open to accepting migrants, while the societies of Central Europe are 
much less willing to deal with the influx (Lehne 2016).
anti-immigration sentiments are also a rising concern across Europe, with political 
parties such as the uK independence party, alternative for Germany and France’s 
national Front enjoying increasing popularity (Ellyatt 2015). Many member countries are 
hesitant to accept large numbers of migrants from the Middle East and north africa due 
to security concerns, which have been heightened by the terrorist attacks in paris and 
Brussels. immigration and terrorism are the two main concerns of the European popula-
tion. according to the latest Eurobarometer survey conducted in spring 2016, over 48% 
of respondents cited immigration as one of the two most important issues facing the Eu 
at the moment, with concern about terrorism reaching 39%. Terrorism was cited as one 
of the most important issues in all member states, with the highest figures in ireland 
and Cyprus (50%), romania (49%), Croatia (48%), Luxembourg (47%), France (39%) 
and Belgium (35%) (Maurice 2016). although with rising migration many Europeans 
express an increased fear of terrorism, there is no evidence-based link between the two 
phenomena. The lack of agreement on burden sharing regarding migrants has caused 
many Eu member states to consider the reintroduction of internal borders within the 
Eu (Funk and parkes 2016). in 2015 Germany reinstated border controls, and it was 
followed by austria, the netherlands, Slovakia and Hungary. These actions are imped-
ing the free movement of cross-border Eu workers and the exchange of goods, and are 
endangering the very idea of the Schengen area.
The Eu is taking several measures to effectively overcome the obstacles and nega-
tive effects of the increasing migration crisis. in april 2016 the European Commission 
adopted a Communication launching the process for a reform of the Common Euro-
pean asylum System, which would meet the need for options that ensure a fair and 
sustainable system for allocating asylum applicants among member states (European 
Commission 2015b). The Eu has also launched Common Security and Defence policy 
operations in the Mediterranean and strengthened the role of Europol, both with the aim 
of continuing to dismantle the human trafficking networks. Furthermore, the new con-
cept of hot spots will allow the European asylum Support office, Frontex and Europol to 
work on the ground in the Eu member states concerned, providing identification and fin-
gerprint registration in order to maintain a better system of control for arriving migrants 
(European Commission 2016).
Impact of migration flows on Africa
a snapshot of africa’s population in the un’s 2015 population review (un Department 
of Economic and Social affairs, population Division 2015) shows that by 2015, the con-
tinent was home to 1.2 billion people (16% of the earth’s population). it is estimated that 
by the year 2050, the population will have doubled. The vastness of africa is best illus-
trated by the fact that with around 30 million square kilometres of land, africa takes up 
one-fifth of the total global land surface.
297
 EuropEan ViEw (2016) 15:291–304
1 3
a look at the present situation suggests that the European leadership tends to solve 
the challenges created by african problems by trying to apply tailored European solu-
tions; the same paradigm applies to arab problems. Europe accepts and adapts to the 
increased inflow of african skilled labour forces by attempting to rapidly integrate the 
migrants into European countries, which is intensifying the already critical brain drain in 
african countries.
The creation of temporary accommodation in hot spots in buffer countries such as 
Turkey or Morocco for those who have been forced out of african countries could prove 
to be a better solution in social, cultural and economic terms than long-term integra-
tion procedures that do not sufficiently consider the difficulties of integrating people 
from ethnically distant countries, cultures and traditions. Such integration procedures 
have a tendency to negatively tint assumptions and perceptions. it should be noted that 
looking for solutions in Europe for african problems seems to cause other unwanted 
effects, such as radicalisation and the spread of violence and terrorist movements. it 
also puts additional pressure on governments and societies to handle emigrants’ eve-
ryday needs within a very short time frame and leaves experts struggling as volatile 
developments call for flexibility from state actors in the receiving countries. The visible 
discomfort reflected in reports of growing criminal offences and terrorist threats among 
the various European populations is becoming increasingly obvious. European state 
actors do not seem to have found the necessary spontaneity and flexibility regarding the 
introduction of additional security measures or specific expert capacity, or in terms of 
suitable infrastructure. while there is no question that there is a need to protect life and 
respect human rights, the equal claim across Europe for the protection and respect of 
the people’s rights in their home countries is getting louder. unrealistic expectations of 
the newcomers combined with unwillingness to adopt to European standards can result 
in increased violence as a means to express frustration. Moreover, such expectations 
can feed further polarisation and already existing nationalist tendencies, culminating in 
xenophobic outbursts, radicalisation and hate crimes.
we should learn from past events, such as the case of Zimbabwe, when a downturn 
in development, which started with the land reforms of 1998 and 2000, led to military 
and police brutality against the citizens, ordered by the Mugabe administration, and 
forced people out of the country. Zimbabwean men and women immigrated to the uS, 
the uK, Canada, australia and new Zealand; many also moved to neighbouring coun-
tries such as Botswana (Tevera and Crush 2003).
according to a January 2014 world Bank report, the number of african migrants dou-
bled between 1980 and 2010, reaching 30.6 million. This represents around 3% of the 
continent’s total population. approximately half of these african migrants stay in africa, 
with Côte d’ivoire, South africa and Burkina Faso as the most popular destinations. 
However, the number of african migrants who stay in africa has decreased steadily 
over time (from 59% in 1980 to 51% in 2010). There is a growing movement of north 
african migrants to the Middle East as well as to Europe, which is the second most 
popular destination (Ehrhart et al. 2014).
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Recommendations for proactive measures 
and options
Shifting the focus onto who the most dominant international stakeholders in africa are, 
it can be seen that there is a prominent Chinese presence, which has increased over 
the past two decades, fairly undisturbed by and away from European attention. China 
plays a significant economic role, with substantial control of the mineral resource mar-
ket (alessi and Xu 2015). Based on ample political investment, China has contributed 
much to enhancing stability and has simultaneously extended its strategic presence (in 
the area of military security too). Equally, followed by Brazil, india, israel, and Turkey, 
the current trend for China is to develop a strategic presence and intensified economic 
leverage in africa. The development of the infrastructure in agriculture and mining is 
bringing employment creation for africans, and keeping an eye on wage conditions in 
the labour market can help to prevent workers from looking for better circumstances 
elsewhere. The development of the market comes with a requirement for investment 
security and improved political and economic environments. This means in particular 
that there must be the political will to eliminate corruption and carry out structured politi-
cal reforms.
The development and modernisation of infrastructure requires training, education and 
capacity building. By inviting international academic institutions and economic stake-
holders and manufacturers to the continent to develop tailored programmes in specific 
areas (e.g. health care or high-end technology), the progressive transfer of knowledge 
and technology will allow for greater compatibility among and better functionality of ser-
vices in african countries.
The massive numbers of people who have forced entry into Europe through regular 
and irregular migration clearly show that trying to build solutions here can hardly be 
of sustainable long-term value for European countries. The unexpectedly large num-
bers of foreigners are overstretching social welfare due to constraints on the budget-
ary resources and economic capabilities of individual governments. The basic human 
needs for acceptable standards of safety and economic prospects, which are the nota-
ble push-factors from the african conflict belt, act as pull-factors in the receiving coun-
tries of Europe. Destination countries such as Germany, austria, the uK and Sweden 
are well known for their sophisticated social welfare systems. These factors attract 
migrants and encourage even greater flows through the misleading messages being 
conveyed that the doors are wide open and that the charitable social welfare packages 
are a ‘free for all’ opportunity.
International economic connectivity to create employment 
in less conflict‑ridden countries and regions
Economic connectivity can serve as a basic method, depending on individual circum-
stances and needs, to establish temporary accommodation hot spots in buffer countries 
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and regions. The groundwork can be prepared through international cooperation that 
builds political and economic bridges with more stable countries in the Mediterranean 
region for migrants originating from arab countries. Here Turkey could serve a pivotal 
role and gain economic importance as an Eu partner country by providing temporary 
economic arrangements for migrants. This approach could replace the Eu’s expensive 
investment in securing its external borders. investment incentives aimed at promoting 
public–private partnerships based on intergovernmental cooperation treaties between 
European and african countries could build the bridges which bring politics and the 
economy together. people with african roots from the Horn of africa and beyond could 
be settled in more stable countries in the sub-Saharan region.
international economic connectivity as a new aspect of development cooperation 
would bring actors together in a multi-stakeholder approach with financial support from 
the international donor community. This would serve to promote a viable economic 
production industry, and create and modernise basic infrastructure, such as transna-
tional road and rail transport corridors and networks. European–african partnership 
agreements with an increased emphasis on the development of road and rail trans-
port systems across the continent would serve to create employment and to feed into 
more efficient resource management, with increased benefits for the african popula-
tion. attractive and investment-friendly packages for international trade and industrial 
investors, combined with security for investments, would have a positive impact on the 
creation of employment. Furthermore, the provision of skilled workers from industrial 
countries to assist in ‘train the trainers’ programmes, combined with the transfer of 
modern technology, would boost the abilities of the skilled labour force in the tempo-
rary establishments and equip them for realistic employment conditions in competitive 
labour markets. This particular model reflects the likelihood of people who are forced 
out of their native countries temporarily acquiring better positions and opportunities and 
improving their skills. This would prepare them for a return to their countries once con-
flict has ended and there is a need to rebuild society and destroyed or dysfunctional 
infrastructure.
Development of trade and industrial productivity through the 
transfer of expert knowledge, capacity building and training
Building economic bridges with the aim of temporarily settling migrants, including refu-
gees, means countries are identified for specific roles (e.g. Morocco for migrants stem-
ming from the Middle East, and israel, which already hosts refugees from Eritrea) and 
given substantial political and financial support to serve as buffer and/or transition coun-
tries of closer proximity to the particular countries in the region. Directing migrants into 
such transition countries, which have a simpler way of life and where the more famil-
iar eco-social systems better match their original backgrounds, has the implied advan-
tage of shorter assimilation periods and a much quicker integration time for newcomers. 
This, in return, means a more rapid turnaround in terms of productivity and earlier eco-
nomic returns in the new transition countries. at the end of this equation there is the 
potential for another positive outcome: once the countries of origin have established a 
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stable peace and are rebuilding, the chances of encouraging the skilled labour force to 
move back and rebuild their home countries will be higher as they will be transferring 
within the region and thereby the risk of an enormous decline in the quality of life will 
be lower. Their living standards would be boosted by training and employment, and the 
ultimate goal would be repatriation to their country of origin after the end of the conflict. 
This measure would prevent further brain drain from the african continent.
Migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development
For the first time, the 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development includes migra-
tion in the global development framework and provides countries with comprehensive 
directions on effective migration governance. un agencies, such as the international 
organization for Migration, elaborate on the specific references made in the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs) and set them as the basis for their activities. amongst 
the various initiatives being developed is the Migration Governance index, which has 
been created as a tool to measure the effectiveness of national policies for safe and 
regular migration as per target 10.7 of the SDGs (see Figure 2). SDG 10.7, in particular, 
calls on countries to ‘facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of 
Figure 2  Migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
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people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration poli-
cies’ (international organization for Migration 2016).
Conclusion
at the present time more than 85% of refugees and migrants are being hosted in 
developing countries. This points to a need for the international community to adopt 
a new and more creative approach. Concerted action is required to create for migrant 
populations a better social environment in areas less affected by conflict. For dec-
ades European policymakers have tried to persuade african governments to introduce 
democratisation procedures with the hope of creating more stability and reducing the 
potential for violence and conflict. However this process will take time. in fact, inter-
national political interference has not had the desired result and further migration 
flows from african countries are evidence of this. africa’s population will double by 
2050. Given these dynamic trends and the economic, political and security challenges 
that african countries have to face, further major migration waves to Europe can be 
expected, augmented by support for migration from the growing african diasporas. 
Europe will have to tackle growing migration pressure from africa, as illustrated in the 
un forecasts. all facts considered, the current level of integration in Europe in the areas 
of freedom of movement, migration and asylum is insufficient, and will hardly allow an 
effective common response to be made to the further development of the crisis (Lehne 
2016). European countries should be more willing to show mutual political will, agree 
on a common migration management policy and take responsibility for their individual 
shares of migrants, without arguing over the actual numbers of migrants in Europe. it 
can be inferred that the current level of global mobility is manageable when dealt with 
pragmatically, locally and on its own terms.
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